前言概要
在逆向分析过程中,LLDB动态调试不仅能直观揭示应用的执行流程,更是验证静态推断的关键手段。本文结合实际破解案例,展示如何借助LLDB捕捉关键函数调用、解析寄存器和内存变化,从而逐步还原应用的许可授权逻辑与核心验证机制。这一过程不仅加深了对目标程序的理解,也凸显了动态调试在逆向分析中的重要作用。
免责声明
本文所有内容仅用于学术研究、技术探讨及教育学习的目的,旨在帮助读者加深对软件安全及逆向工程的理解。文中描述的技术与方法并非鼓励或支持任何未经授权的行为,亦不应将本文内容用于任何未经授权的目的。软件破解及相关技术的使用需遵守各国法律法规,任何个人或机构在实践时应对自身行为负责,作者不承担因不当使用本文内容所引发的任何责任。
寻踪觅迹
起手式,通过梳理应用目录结构探寻文件资源,可见处于MacOS下的核心可执行文件C*S*X,Frameworks、Resources、Info.plist等也一应俱全。依据文件名称字面意思,Frameworks下的Legit.framework尤其值得关注,或许正是用于检测合法许可的框架;还有CryptoSwift bundle,表明APP的授权机制用到了加密。
$ tree 'C*S*X.app/Contents' -L 2 C*S*X.app/Contents ├── CodeResources ├── Frameworks │ ├── InsiderKit.framework │ ├── Lava.framework │ ├── Legit.framework │ ├── LetsMove.framework │ ├── LoginItemKit.framework │ ├── Sentry.framework │ ├── Sparkle.framework │ ├── VectorBoolean.framework │ └── libswift_Concurrency.dylib ├── Info.plist ├── Library ├── MacOS │ └── C*S*X ├── PkgInfo ├── PlugIns ├── Resources │ ├── .... │ ├── CryptoSwift_CryptoSwift.bundle │ ├── Preferences.nib │ ├── RenewLicense.nib │ └── .... └── _CodeSignature
启动应用继续观察,看到EULA窗口第一时间弹出,点击Agree进入下一步。此刻程序检测到运行路径并不处于Applications下,提示是否移至Applications文件夹,按照习惯选择不移动。最终应用进入到激活界面,待激活后用户便可正常使用该APP。

顺藤摸瓜
有了以上初步探索,是时候请出IDA Pro了。IDA Pro启动,导入可执行文件C*S*X,凭借对Legit框架作用的推测,直接定位到IDA Pro中Imports表的相应位置。
▼@rpath ▼Legit.framework ▼Versions ▼A ▼Legit 0x10076E7C0 protocol descriptor for LegitUpdaterDelegate 0x10076E7C8 protocol descriptor for LegitCloudAPIDelegate 0x10076E7D0 protocol descriptor for LegitDelegate 0x10076E7D8 nominal type descriptor for LegitC*S*.DialogOptions 0x10076E7E0 LegitC*S*.init(productName:appName:website:email:delegate:updaterDelegate:cloudAPIDelegate:) 0x10076E7E8 LegitC*S*.checkForUpdates(dialogs:) 0x10076E7F0 LegitC*S*.getChangelogURL() 0x10076E7F8 LegitC*S*.getAppcastURLString() 0x10076E800 type metadata accessor for LegitC*S*
在Imports表中,由于LegitC*S*.init(…)的参数比较可疑,理应重点关照。
0x10076E7E0 LegitC*S*.init(productName:appName:website:email:delegate:updaterDelegate:cloudAPIDelegate:)
双击转至0x10076E7E0位置,其中有一处交叉引用:LegitC*S*.init(...)+8↑j。
UNDEF:0x10076E7E0 IMPORT __imp__$s5Legit0A9C*S*C11productName03appE07website5email8delegate15updaterDelegate16cloudAPIDelegateACSS_S3SAA0aK0_pAA0a7UpdaterK0_pAA0a5CloudM0_ptcfc UNDEF:0x10076E7E0 ; CODE XREF: LegitC*S*.init(productName:appName:website:email:delegate:updaterDelegate:cloudAPIDelegate:)+8↑j UNDEF:0x10076E7E0 ; DATA XREF: __la_symbol_ptr:_$s5Legit0A9C*S*C11productName03appE07website5email8delegate15updaterDelegate16cloudAPIDelegateACSS_S3SAA0aK0_pAA0a7UpdaterK0_pAA0a5CloudM0_ptcfc_ptr↑o
继续双击转至位于__stubs段0x100537DDC地址的Legit.LegitC*S*.init(…),里面也有一处交叉引用:sub_1000E2C88+F8↑p。
__stubs:0x100537DDC ; =============== S U B R O U T I N E ======================================= __stubs:0x100537DDC ; Attributes: thunk __stubs:0x100537DDC ; Legit.LegitC*S*.init(productName: Swift.String, appName: Swift.String, website: Swift.String, email: Swift.String, delegate: Legit.LegitDelegate, updaterDelegate: Legit.LegitUpdaterDelegate, cloudAPIDelegate: Legit.LegitCloudAPIDelegate) -> Legit.LegitC*S* __stubs:0x100537DDC _$s5Legit0A9C*S*C11productName03appE07website5email8delegate15updaterDelegate16cloudAPIDelegateACSS_S3SAA0aK0_pAA0a7UpdaterK0_pAA0a5CloudM0_ptcfc __stubs:0x100537DDC ; CODE XREF: sub_1000E2C88+F8↑p __stubs:0x100537DDC ADRP X16, #_$s5Legit0A9C*S*C11productName03appE07website5email8delegate15updaterDelegate16cloudAPIDelegateACSS_S3SAA0aK0_pAA0a7UpdaterK0_pAA0a5CloudM0_ptcfc_ptr@PAGE ; Address of Page __stubs:0x100537DE0 LDR X16, [X16,#_$s5Legit0A9C*S*C11productName03appE07website5email8delegate15updaterDelegate16cloudAPIDelegateACSS_S3SAA0aK0_pAA0a7UpdaterK0_pAA0a5CloudM0_ptcfc_ptr@PAGEOFF] ; Load from Memory __stubs:0x100537DE4 BR X16 ; __imp__$s5Legit0A9C*S*C11productName03appE07website5email8delegate15updaterDelegate16cloudAPIDelegateACSS_S3SAA0aK0_pAA0a7UpdaterK0_pAA0a5CloudM0_ptcfc ; Branch To Register __stubs:0x100537DE4 ; End of function LegitC*S*.init(productName:appName:website:email:delegate:updaterDelegate:cloudAPIDelegate:)
转至sub_1000E2C88+F8↑p,下面是sub_1000E2C88中调用了Legit.LegitC*S*.init(…)的loc_1000E2CD0分支。
__text:0x1000E2C88 ; __int64 sub_1000E2C88() __text:0x1000E2C88 sub_1000E2C88 ; CODE XREF: sub_10018C41C+24↓p __text:0x1000E2CD0 loc_1000E2CD0 ; CODE XREF: sub_1000E2C88+41C↓j __text:0x1000E2CD0 ADRP X8, #qword_10076D070@PAGE ; Address of Page __text:0x1000E2CD4 LDR X19, [X8,#qword_10076D070@PAGEOFF] ; Load from Memory __text:0x1000E2CD8 MOV X0, #0 ; Rd = Op2 __text:0x1000E2CDC BL _$s5Legit0A9C*S*CMa ; Branch with Link __text:0x1000E2CE0 MOV W1, #0x70 ; 'p' ; Rd = Op2 __text:0x1000E2CE4 MOV W2, #7 ; Rd = Op2 __text:0x1000E2CE8 BL _swift_allocObject ; Branch with Link __text:0x1000E2CEC MOV X21, X0 ; Rd = Op2 __text:0x1000E2CF0 MOV X0, X20 ; id __text:0x1000E2CF4 BL _objc_retain ; Branch with Link __text:0x1000E2CF8 BL _objc_retain ; Branch with Link __text:0x1000E2CFC MOV X20, X0 ; Rd = Op2 __text:0x1000E2D00 MOV X0, X19 ; id __text:0x1000E2D04 BL _objc_retain ; Branch with Link __text:0x1000E2D08 MOV X8, #0xD000000000000013 __text:0x1000E2D10 ADRL X9, off_10067A188 __text:0x1000E2D18 STP X20, X9, [SP,#0x150+var_130] ; Store Pair __text:0x1000E2D1C ADRL X9, off_100679570 __text:0x1000E2D24 STP X0, X9, [SP,#0x150+var_140] ; Store Pair __text:0x1000E2D28 ADRL X9, off_10067A1B8 __text:0x1000E2D30 STP X20, X9, [SP,#0x150+var_150] ; Store Pair __text:0x1000E2D34 MOV X0, #0x6F68736E61656C63 __text:0x1000E2D44 MOV X2, #0x6F68536E61656C43 __text:0x1000E2D54 MOV X3, #0xEB00000000582074 __text:0x1000E2D60 ADD X4, X8, #2 ; Rd = Op1 + Op2 __text:0x1000E2D64 ORR X5, X22, #0x8000000000000000 ; Rd = Op1 | Op2 __text:0x1000E2D68 ORR X7, X23, #0x8000000000000000 ; Rd = Op1 | Op2 __text:0x1000E2D6C MOV X1, #0xEA00000000007874 __text:0x1000E2D74 MOV X6, #0xD000000000000013 __text:0x1000E2D7C MOV X20, X21 ; Rd = Op2 __text:0x1000E2D80 BL _$s5Legit0A9C*S*C11productName03appE07website5email8delegate15updaterDelegate16cloudAPIDelegateACSS_S3SAA0aK0_pAA0a7UpdaterK0_pAA0a5CloudM0_ptcfc ; Branch with Link __text:0x1000E2D84 ADRP X19, #qword_10076D0A0@PAGE ; Address of Page __text:0x1000E2D88 LDR X8, [X19,#qword_10076D0A0@PAGEOFF] ; Load from Memory __text:0x1000E2D8C STR X0, [X19,#qword_10076D0A0@PAGEOFF] ; Store to Memory __text:0x1000E2D90 MOV X0, X8 ; Rd = Op2 __text:0x1000E2D94 BL _swift_release ; Branch with Link __text:0x1000E2D98 LDR X20, [X19,#qword_10076D0A0@PAGEOFF] ; Load from Memory __text:0x1000E2D9C CBZ X20, loc_1000E2DBC ; Compare and Branch on Zero __text:0x1000E2DA0 LDR X8, [X20] ; Load from Memory __text:0x1000E2DA4 LDR X21, [X8,#0x188] ; Load from Memory __text:0x1000E2DA8 MOV X0, X20 ; Rd = Op2 __text:0x1000E2DAC BL _swift_retain ; Branch with Link __text:0x1000E2DB0 BLR X21 ; Branch and Link Register __text:0x1000E2DB4 MOV X0, X20 ; Rd = Op2 __text:0x1000E2DB8 BL _swift_release ; Branch with Link
如上汇编片段中,先调用了LegitC*S*类元数据访问器,获取这个类的元数据指针。后续通过一系列ADRL和MOV指令,加载了包括产品官网、联系邮箱在内的多个字符串常量。
准备工作就绪后,程序在0x1000E2D80处调用了LegitC*S*.init(...),完成授权对象的创建。其返回的对象指针随即被存入全局变量qword_10076D0A0中。而关键的一步发生在之后0x1000E2D9C处的一个CBZ判断点。
__text:0x1000E2D9C CBZ X20, loc_1000E2DBC ; Compare and Branch on Zero ; ... __text:0x1000E2DBC loc_1000E2DBC ; CODE XREF: sub_1000E2C88+114↑j __text:0x1000E2DBC MOV W0, #0x10 ; Rd = Op2 __text:0x1000E2DC0 BL sub_1000CDAB8 ; Branch with Link __text:0x1000E2DC4 TBNZ W0, #0, loc_1000E304C ; Test and Branch Non-Zero __text:0x1000E2DC8 LDR X19, [X19,#qword_10076D0A0@PAGEOFF] ; Load from Memory __text:0x1000E2DCC CBZ X19, loc_1000E304C ; Compare and Branch on Zero ; ...
此CBZ会检查刚刚创建的LegitC*S*对象是否为nil。若为空,程序将跳转至loc_1000E2DBC,此分支中由于TBNZ与CBZ两指令的存在,无论sub_1000CDAB8的返回值如何,都会跳转至loc_1000E304C,最后在其中RET,结束sub_1000E2C88的调用。
__text:0x1000E304C loc_1000E304C ; CODE XREF: sub_1000E2C88+13C↑j __text:0x1000E304C ; sub_1000E2C88+144↑j __text:0x1000E304C LDP X29, X30, [SP,#0x150+var_s0] ; Load Pair __text:0x1000E3050 LDP X20, X19, [SP,#0x150+var_10] ; Load Pair __text:0x1000E3054 LDP X22, X21, [SP,#0x150+var_20] ; Load Pair __text:0x1000E3058 LDP X24, X23, [SP,#0x150+var_30] ; Load Pair __text:0x1000E305C LDP X26, X25, [SP,#0x150+var_40] ; Load Pair __text:0x1000E3060 LDP X28, X27, [SP,#0x150+var_50] ; Load Pair __text:0x1000E3064 ADD SP, SP, #0x160 ; Rd = Op1 + Op2 __text:0x1000E3068 RET ; Return from Subroutine
如此一来,只要0x1000E2D9C处的CBZ判断能抵至loc_1000E2DBC分支,便可绕过此后所有试图使用该对象的操作。
弹窗消除
基于上述静态分析,足已锁定0x1000E2D9C处的CBZ判断或可能是决定授权流程的一个关键。为了验证这一推论,下文将使用LLDB进行动态调试与分析,我们的目标是中断在这一关键指令执行之前,观察LegitC*S*.init(…)返回的真实对象指针。
首先,通过以下lldb命令在终端中创建目标,成功进入lldb debugger交互控制台后,一定要先运行一次,否则后续设置的断点将无法触及。
$ lldb 'C*S*X.app' (lldb) target create "C*S*X.app" Current executable set to 'C*S*X.app' (arm64). (lldb) r Process 32088 launched: 'C*S*X.app/Contents/MacOS/C*S*X' (arm64) ...
然后,就可在0x1000E2D9C处设置一个地址断点,重启应用,成功地在预定位置中断了程序执行。
(lldb) br s -a 0x1000E2D9C Breakpoint 16: where = C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol7429 + 276, address = 0x00000001000e2d9c (lldb) r There is a running process, kill it and restart?: [Y/n] Y Process 38851 exited with status = 9 (0x00000009) Process 39674 launched: 'C*S*X.app/Contents/MacOS/C*S*X' (arm64) ...... Process 39674 stopped * thread #1, queue = 'com.apple.main-thread', stop reason = breakpoint 16.1 frame #0: 0x00000001000e2d9c C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol7429 + 276 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol7429: -> 0x1000e2d9c <+276>: cbz x20, 0x1000e2dbc ; <+308> 0x1000e2da0 <+280>: ldr x8, [x20] 0x1000e2da4 <+284>: ldr x21, [x8, #0x188] 0x1000e2da8 <+288>: mov x0, x20 Target 0: (C*S*X) stopped.
输入register命令读取寄存器x20的地址,或使用对象打印命令po打印出x20,其就是一个Legit.LegitC*S*对象指针。
(lldb) register read x20 x20 = 0x000060000292d650 (lldb) po $x20 Legit.LegitC*S*
正常情况下,无论是否拥有许可,LegitC*S*.init返回的都会是一个Legit.LegitC*S*对象,全局变量qword_10076D0A0从而被更新,后续经过0x1000E2D9C位置CBZ指令的判断进入正常授权检查路径。
这种情况下,如果对LegitC*S*.init进行ret0操作,使其定值返回0,让调用方获得一个空指针,或许就能绕过正常的授权检查。
据此推论,我们清理掉前面的断点,并将新的断点打至0x1000E2D80位置,再度重启应用。
(lldb) br s -a 0x1000E2D80 Breakpoint 15: where = C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol7429 + 248, address = 0x00000001000e2d80 (lldb) r There is a running process, kill it and restart?: [Y/n] Y Process 37247 exited with status = 9 (0x00000009) Process 37296 launched: 'C*S*X.app/Contents/MacOS/C*S*X' (arm64) ...... Process 37296 stopped * thread #1, queue = 'com.apple.main-thread', stop reason = breakpoint 15.1 frame #0: 0x00000001000e2d80 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol7429 + 248 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol7429: -> 0x1000e2d80 <+248>: bl 0x100537ddc ; symbol stub for: Legit.LegitC*S*.init(productName: Swift.String, appName: Swift.String, website: Swift.String, email: Swift.String, delegate: Legit.LegitDelegate, updaterDelegate: Legit.LegitUpdaterDelegate, cloudAPIDelegate: Legit.LegitCloudAPIDelegate) -> Legit.LegitC*S* 0x1000e2d84 <+252>: adrp x19, 1675 0x1000e2d88 <+256>: ldr x8, [x19, #0xa0] 0x1000e2d8c <+260>: str x0, [x19, #0xa0] Target 0: (C*S*X) stopped.
抵达0x1000E2D80后,利用memory命令对LegitC*S*.init进行ret0操作。
(lldb) memory write 0x100537DDC 00 00 80 52 c0 03 5f d6
内存修改完后,不必着急continue,先在0x1000E2D9C位置继续下个断点,观察寄存器的变化,可看到下面打印出的结果完全符合预期。
(lldb) br s -a 0x1000E2D9C Breakpoint 2: where = C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol7429 + 276, address = 0x00000001000e2d9c (lldb) c Process 52980 resuming Process 52980 stopped * thread #1, queue = 'com.apple.main-thread', stop reason = breakpoint 2.1 frame #0: 0x00000001000e2d9c C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol7429 + 276 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol7429: -> 0x1000e2d9c <+276>: cbz x20, 0x1000e2dbc ; <+308> 0x1000e2da0 <+280>: ldr x8, [x20] 0x1000e2da4 <+284>: ldr x21, [x8, #0x188] 0x1000e2da8 <+288>: mov x0, x20 Target 0: (C*S*X) stopped. (lldb) register read x20 x20 = 0x0000000000000000 (lldb) po $x20 <nil>
返回0在理论上本表示初始化失败,而由于调用方sub_1000E2C88的设计比较规范,它在收到返回值后,立即依靠CBZ指令对此指针进行了是否为空的检查。这正是我们可以利用的关键点,ret0操作恰好触发了这个检查,使得程序顺利地进入到错误处理分支,从而绕过后续所有试图使用该对象的操作。
最后,在lldb中输入c继续运行程序,将会顺理成章地观察到原本应该弹出的激活界面并未弹出,这一现象应证了前面的推论。
(lldb) c Process 52980 resuming
倘若将视线再放开阔一些,不只局限于sub_1000E2C88中,继续往上追溯到它的交叉引用处sub_10018C41C+24↓p。
__text:0x10018C41C sub_10018C41C ; CODE XREF: sub_10018C36C+10↑p __text:0x10018C41C ; sub_100224224+3C0↓p __text:0x10018C41C SUB SP, SP, #0xA0 ; Rd = Op1 - Op2 __text:0x10018C420 STP X26, X25, [SP,#0x90+var_40] ; Store Pair __text:0x10018C424 STP X24, X23, [SP,#0x90+var_30] ; Store Pair __text:0x10018C428 STP X22, X21, [SP,#0x90+var_20] ; Store Pair __text:0x10018C42C STP X20, X19, [SP,#0x90+var_10] ; Store Pair __text:0x10018C430 STP X29, X30, [SP,#0x90+var_s0] ; Store Pair __text:0x10018C434 ADD X29, SP, #0x90 ; Rd = Op1 + Op2 __text:0x10018C438 MOV X19, X20 ; Rd = Op2 __text:0x10018C43C BL _PFMoveToApplicationsFolderIfNecessary ; Branch with Link __text:0x10018C440 BL sub_1000E2C88 ; Branch with Link __text:0x10018C444 ADRP X8, #qword_100716DA8@PAGE ; Address of Page __text:0x10018C448 LDR X8, [X8,#qword_100716DA8@PAGEOFF] ; Load from Memory __text:0x10018C44C CMN X8, #1 ; Set cond. codes on Op1 + Op2 __text:0x10018C450 B.NE loc_10018C83C ; Branch
在sub_10018C41C中,程序先在0x10018C43C位置调用了_PFMoveToApplicationsFolderIfNecessary提示是否将应用移动至Applications文件夹,紧随其后便调用了sub_1000E2C88来进行许可激活判断。这个调用顺序与启动应用时所观察到的弹窗先后出现顺序是一致的。
而对此,我们其实完全可以连根拔起,将整个sub_1000E2C88调用除掉,其效果可谓一网打尽,与前面对LegitC*S*.init进行ret0操作相比,应是有过之无不及。但从感官上讲,都仅是消除了应用的激活弹窗而已。
(lldb) br s -a 0x10018C440 Breakpoint 14: where = C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol10641 + 36, address = 0x000000010018c440 (lldb) r There is a running process, kill it and restart?: [Y/n] Y Process 37141 exited with status = 9 (0x00000009) Process 37185 launched: 'C*S*X.app/Contents/MacOS/C*S*X' (arm64) ...... Process 37185 stopped * thread #1, queue = 'com.apple.main-thread', stop reason = breakpoint 14.1 frame #0: 0x000000010018c440 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol10641 + 36 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol10641: -> 0x10018c440 <+36>: bl 0x1000e2c88 ; ___lldb_unnamed_symbol7429 0x10018c444 <+40>: adrp x8, 1418 0x10018c448 <+44>: ldr x8, [x8, #0xda8] 0x10018c44c <+48>: cmn x8, #0x1 Target 0: (C*S*X) stopped. (lldb) memory write 0x10018C440 1f 20 03 d5 (lldb) c Process 37185 resuming
功能解锁
进一步打开应用,发现竟真如上所说,前述操作只是消除了应用的激活弹窗而已,绝大多数主要功能仍处于受限模式,无论是偏好设置中的各类选项,还是状态栏菜单中的截图功能,都被锁定。如下图中的Check for Updates按钮与右侧的截图功能等按钮均呈灰色不可用状态。

但注意到一个细节,右侧状态栏菜单下方有一个未灰化的Activate按钮。的确,激活功能在应用未激活状态下可用这是必然的。但若动用下逆向的思维,可想而知,只要应用成功激活后,这个功能绝对不可见,彼时按钮将消失殆尽,否则应用就是违背了用户体验设计原则。
为此,再次回到IDA Pro中寻找与Activate按钮相关的代码,并从对其是隐是显状态的判断之处进行入手。应该不难找到__data段中的C*S*_X.StatusMenuController.activateButton属性名,在它前后还有许多其他功能按钮的属性名。不过目前我们只专注于activateButton。
__data:0x100723A38 _OBJC_IVAR_$__TtC11C*S*_X20StatusMenuController.allInOneButton DCQ 0x18 __data:0x100723A38 ; DATA XREF: -[StatusMenuController allInOneButton]+8↑o __data:0x100723A38 ; -[StatusMenuController allInOneButton]+C↑r ... __data:0x100723A80 _OBJC_IVAR_$__TtC11C*S*_X20StatusMenuController.activateButton DCQ 0x60 __data:0x100723A80 ; DATA XREF: -[StatusMenuController activateButton]+8↑o __data:0x100723A80 ; -[StatusMenuController activateButton]+C↑r ... __data:0x100723A88 _OBJC_IVAR_$__TtC11C*S*_X20StatusMenuController.checkForUpdatesButton DCQ 0x68 __data:0x100723A88 ; DATA XREF: -[StatusMenuController checkForUpdatesButton]+8↑o __data:0x100723A88 ; -[StatusMenuController checkForUpdatesButton]+C↑r ...
按X查看引用到activateButton的所有位置。
Address Text -[StatusMenuController activateButton]+8 ADRP X8, #_OBJC_IVAR_$__TtC11C*S*_X20StatusMenuController.activateButton@PAGE -[StatusMenuController activateButton]+C LDR X8, [X8,#_OBJC_IVAR_$__TtC11C*S*_X20StatusMenuController.activateButton@PAGEOFF] -[StatusMenuController setActivateButton:]+4 ADRP X8, #_OBJC_IVAR_$__TtC11C*S*_X20StatusMenuController.activateButton@PAGE -[StatusMenuController setActivateButton:]+8 LDR X8, [X8,#_OBJC_IVAR_$__TtC11C*S*_X20StatusMenuController.activateButton@PAGEOFF] sub_1000BF3EC+238 ADRP X8, #_OBJC_IVAR_$__TtC11C*S*_X20StatusMenuController.activateButton@PAGE sub_1000BF3EC+23C LDR X8, [X8,#_OBJC_IVAR_$__TtC11C*S*_X20StatusMenuController.activateButton@PAGEOFF] sub_1000C03AC+FC ADRP X8, #_OBJC_IVAR_$__TtC11C*S*_X20StatusMenuController.activateButton@PAGE sub_1000C03AC+100 LDR X8, [X8,#_OBJC_IVAR_$__TtC11C*S*_X20StatusMenuController.activateButton@PAGEOFF] -[StatusMenuController .cxx_destruct]+C0 ADRP X8, #_OBJC_IVAR_$__TtC11C*S*_X20StatusMenuController.activateButton@PAGE -[StatusMenuController .cxx_destruct]+C4 LDR X8, [X8,#_OBJC_IVAR_$__TtC11C*S*_X20StatusMenuController.activateButton@PAGEOFF] __objc_const:00000001006B47C8 __objc2_ivar <_OBJC_IVAR_$__TtC11C*S*_X20StatusMenuController.activateButton,\
或导入idc Python库,使用DataRefsTo方法打印出所有引用地址。两相对比,同出一辙,只是表现形式不同而已。
import idc for ref in DataRefsTo(0x100723A80): print(hex(ref)) ''' 0x1000bc038 0x1000bc03c 0x1000bc054 0x1000bc058 0x1000bf624 0x1000bf628 0x1000c04a8 0x1000c04ac 0x1000c0ac0 0x1000c0ac4 0x1006b47c8 '''
总共十一处,有点小多。不过,既然前面用过LLDB,那对于这些引用位置,就不必逐一静态分析。只需在LLDB中将上面的地址设置断点,观察哪些会触发中断,再进行针对性的深入分析。
在此之前,先把cxx_destruct和__objc_const段的地址排除掉,然后还会发现前面四对中的每一对,都是处于相邻地址,故取其一即可。最终我们在以下四处地址下断点并重启。
(lldb) br s -a 0x1000BC038 Breakpoint 22: where = C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol6803 + 8, address = 0x00000001000bc038 (lldb) br s -a 0x1000BC054 Breakpoint 23: where = C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol6804 + 4, address = 0x00000001000bc054 (lldb) br s -a 0x1000BF624 Breakpoint 24: where = C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol6869 + 568, address = 0x00000001000bf624 (lldb) br s -a 0x1000C04A8 Breakpoint 25: where = C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol6875 + 252, address = 0x00000001000c04a8 (lldb) r There is a running process, kill it and restart?: [Y/n] Process 9207 exited with status = 9 (0x00000009) Process 12701 launched: 'C*S*X.app/Contents/MacOS/C*S*X' (arm64) Process 12701 stopped * thread #1, queue = 'com.apple.main-thread', stop reason = breakpoint 25.1 frame #0: 0x00000001000c04a8 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol6875 + 252 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol6875: -> 0x1000c04a8 <+252>: adrp x8, 1635 0x1000c04ac <+256>: ldr x8, [x8, #0xa80] 0x1000c04b0 <+260>: add x0, x20, x8 0x1000c04b4 <+264>: mov x1, #0x0 Target 0: (C*S*X) stopped. (lldb) c Process 12701 resuming Process 12701 stopped * thread #1, queue = 'com.apple.main-thread', stop reason = breakpoint 23.1 frame #0: 0x00000001000bc054 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol6804 + 4 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol6804: -> 0x1000bc054 <+4>: adrp x8, 1639 0x1000bc058 <+8>: ldr x8, [x8, #0xa80] 0x1000bc05c <+12>: add x0, x0, x8 0x1000bc060 <+16>: b 0x10053b8e0 ; symbol stub for: swift_unknownObjectWeakAssign Target 0: (C*S*X) stopped. (lldb) c Process 12701 resuming ... Process 12701 stopped * thread #1, queue = 'com.apple.main-thread', stop reason = breakpoint 24.1 frame #0: 0x00000001000bf624 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol6869 + 568 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol6869: -> 0x1000bf624 <+568>: adrp x8, 1636 0x1000bf628 <+572>: ldr x8, [x8, #0xa80] 0x1000bf62c <+576>: add x0, x19, x8 0x1000bf630 <+580>: bl 0x10053b904 ; symbol stub for: swift_unknownObjectWeakLoadStrong Target 0: (C*S*X) stopped.
根据LLDB中实际的观察,发现以下三个地址先后触发了中断。于是,下文将依次针对性分析此三处。
0x1000c04a8:sub_1000C03AC+FC 0x1000bc054:-[StatusMenuController setActivateButton:]+4 0x1000bf624:sub_1000BF3EC+238
针对第一处,我们在LLDB中重新回到0x1000c04a8(sub_1000C03AC+FC)断点处,查看调用栈。
(lldb) r There is a running process, kill it and restart?: [Y/n] Y Process 12877 exited with status = 9 (0x00000009) Process 12933 launched: 'C*S*X.app/Contents/MacOS/C*S*X' (arm64) Process 12933 stopped * thread #1, queue = 'com.apple.main-thread', stop reason = breakpoint 25.1 frame #0: 0x00000001000c04a8 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol6875 + 252 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol6875: -> 0x1000c04a8 <+252>: adrp x8, 1635 0x1000c04ac <+256>: ldr x8, [x8, #0xa80] 0x1000c04b0 <+260>: add x0, x20, x8 0x1000c04b4 <+264>: mov x1, #0x0 Target 0: (C*S*X) stopped. (lldb) bt * thread #1, queue = 'com.apple.main-thread', stop reason = breakpoint 25.1 * frame #0: 0x00000001000c04a8 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol6875 + 252 frame #1: 0x00000001000c09c4 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol6876 + 20 frame #2: 0x0000000197b91878 AppKit`-[NSClassSwapper initWithCoder:] + 808 frame #3: 0x0000000198a81600 UIFoundation`UINibDecoderDecodeObjectForValue + 668
调用栈信息表明,sub_1000C03AC在-[StatusMenuController init]中被调用,更深层的调用来自系统框架AppKit和UIFoundation,这一连串行为似乎是在构建UI初始化,并未涉及任何授权逻辑判断,所以根本没有分析的必要,弃之。
__text:0x1000C09B0 ; _TtC11C*S*_X20StatusMenuController *__cdecl -[StatusMenuController init](_TtC11C*S*_X20StatusMenuController *self, SEL) __text:0x1000C09B0 ___TtC11C*S*_X20StatusMenuController_init_ __text:0x1000C09B0 ; DATA XREF: __objc_methlist:0000000100567F28↓o __text:0x1000C09B0 var_10= -0x10 __text:0x1000C09B0 var_8= -8 __text:0x1000C09B0 var_s0= 0 __text:0x1000C09B0 var_s8= 8 __text:0x1000C09B0 STP X20, X19, [SP,#-0x10+var_10]! ; Store Pair __text:0x1000C09B4 STP X29, X30, [SP,#0x10+var_s0] ; Store Pair __text:0x1000C09B8 ADD X29, SP, #0x10 ; Rd = Op1 + Op2 __text:0x1000C09BC MOV X20, X0 ; Rd = Op2 __text:0x1000C09C0 BL sub_1000C03AC ; Branch with Link __text:0x1000C09C4 LDP X29, X30, [SP,#0x10+var_s0] ; Load Pair __text:0x1000C09C8 LDP X20, X19, [SP+0x10+var_10],#0x20 ; Load Pair __text:0x1000C09CC RET ; Return from Subroutine
再在LLDB中重回至第二处0x1000bc054(-[StatusMenuController setActivateButton:]+4),检查相应的调用栈。
* thread #1, queue = 'com.apple.main-thread', stop reason = breakpoint 23.1 * frame #0: 0x00000001000bc054 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol6804 + 4
对应汇编片段如下,由函数命名可知,setActivateButton为一个标准的setter函数,这里依然未见任何授权逻辑判断,再次弃之。
__text:0x1000BC050 ; void __cdecl -[StatusMenuController setActivateButton:](_TtC11C*S*_X20StatusMenuController *self, SEL, id) __text:0x1000BC050 ___TtC11C*S*_X20StatusMenuController_setActivateButton__ __text:0x1000BC050 ; DATA XREF: __objc_methlist:0000000100567D24↓o __text:0x1000BC050 MOV X1, X2 ; Rd = Op2 __text:0x1000BC054 ADRP X8, #_OBJC_IVAR_$__TtC11C*S*_X20StatusMenuController.activateButton@PAGE ; Address of Page __text:0x1000BC058 LDR X8, [X8,#_OBJC_IVAR_$__TtC11C*S*_X20StatusMenuController.activateButton@PAGEOFF] ; Load from Memory __text:0x1000BC05C ADD X0, X0, X8 ; Rd = Op1 + Op2 __text:0x1000BC060 B _swift_unknownObjectWeakAssign ; Branch
最后来到第三处0x1000bf624,即sub_1000BF3EC+238。
* thread #1, queue = 'com.apple.main-thread', stop reason = breakpoint 24.1 frame #0: 0x00000001000bf624 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol6869 + 568 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol6869: -> 0x1000bf624 <+568>: adrp x8, 1636 0x1000bf628 <+572>: ldr x8, [x8, #0xa80] 0x1000bf62c <+576>: add x0, x19, x8 0x1000bf630 <+580>: bl 0x10053b904 ; symbol stub for: swift_unknownObjectWeakLoadStrong Target 0: (C*S*X) stopped. (lldb) bt * thread #1, queue = 'com.apple.main-thread', stop reason = breakpoint 24.1 * frame #0: 0x00000001000bf624 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol6869 + 568 frame #1: 0x00000001000e36a0 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol7431 + 600 frame #2: 0x000000010018c2dc C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol10638 + 396 frame #3: 0x000000010018c3ec C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol10640 + 96
纯粹的十六进制地址看着不够直观,将如上调用栈地址转换成以下形式。
* frame #0: sub_1000BF3EC+238 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol6869 + 568 frame #1: sub_1000E3448+258 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol7431 + 600 frame #2: sub_10018C150+18C C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol10638 + 396 frame #3: -[AppDelegate applicationDidFinishLaunching:]+60 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol10640 + 96
frame #3处的applicationDidFinishLaunching:意味着应用初始化已完成,它的出现表明正处于应用启动的主干流程之中,这说明以上这条调用栈具有分析的价值。
那么,接下来就深入sub_1000BF3EC内部,分析当中对activateButton的隐显是如何进行决策的。继续从断点位置0x1000bf624开始,分析接下来的指令流。
__text:0x1000BF624 ADRP X8, #_OBJC_IVAR_$__TtC11C*S*_X20StatusMenuController.activateButton@PAGE ; Address of Page __text:0x1000BF628 LDR X8, [X8,#_OBJC_IVAR_$__TtC11C*S*_X20StatusMenuController.activateButton@PAGEOFF] ; Load from Memory __text:0x1000BF62C ADD X0, X19, X8 ; Rd = Op1 + Op2 __text:0x1000BF630 BL _swift_unknownObjectWeakLoadStrong ; Branch with Link __text:0x1000BF63C LDR X1, [X22,#selRef_setHidden_@PAGEOFF] ; SEL __text:0x1000BF640 AND W2, W20, #1 ; Rd = Op1 & Op2 __text:0x1000BF644 BL _objc_msgSend ; Branch with Link
程序先在0x1000BF624位置获取activateButton的实例,随即准备调用setHidden:函数,然后会根据AND指令,即W20寄存器的值来决定是隐藏还是显示activateButton按钮。
朝下再看,程序又对checkForUpdatesButton按钮的隐显进行了处理。不同的是,这次使用的是BIC指令,而非前面的AND指令。这意味着checkForUpdatesButton的隐显行为将与activateButton相反,一个在激活后显示,另一个则在激活后隐藏,这种UI设计完全符合用户体验。
__text:0x1000BF650 ADRP X8, #_OBJC_IVAR_$__TtC11C*S*_X20StatusMenuController.checkForUpdatesButton@PAGE ; Address of Page __text:0x1000BF654 LDR X8, [X8,#_OBJC_IVAR_$__TtC11C*S*_X20StatusMenuController.checkForUpdatesButton@PAGEOFF] ; Load from Memory __text:0x1000BF658 ADD X0, X19, X8 ; Rd = Op1 + Op2 __text:0x1000BF65C BL _swift_unknownObjectWeakLoadStrong ; Branch with Link __text:0x1000BF660 CBZ X0, loc_1000BF8C0 ; Compare and Branch on Zero __text:0x1000BF664 LDR X1, [X22,#selRef_setHidden_@PAGEOFF] ; SEL __text:0x1000BF668 MOV W8, #1 ; Rd = Op2 __text:0x1000BF66C BIC W2, W8, W20 ; Rd = Op1 & ~Op2 __text:0x1000BF670 MOV X21, X0 ; Rd = Op2 __text:0x1000BF674 BL _objc_msgSend ; Branch with Link
因此,以上两个按钮的隐显行为关键在于W20的值,而W20寄存器的值在LLDB中观察到为0。
* thread #1, queue = 'com.apple.main-thread', stop reason = instruction step over frame #0: 0x00000001000bf640 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol6869 + 596 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol6869: -> 0x1000bf640 <+596>: and w2, w20, #0x1 0x1000bf644 <+600>: bl 0x10053b064 ; symbol stub for: objc_msgSend 0x1000bf648 <+604>: mov x0, x21 0x1000bf64c <+608>: bl 0x10053b088 ; symbol stub for: objc_release Target 0: (C*S*X) stopped. (lldb) register read w20 w20 = 0x00000000
试图将W20寄存器的值改为1,continue继续运行程序观察现象。
(lldb) register write w20 1 (lldb) register read w20 w20 = 0x00000001 (lldb) c
可见现象符合预期,甚至超出,不仅状态栏菜单下方的Activate按钮被隐藏了,Check for Updates按钮显现了,并且上面的截图功能按钮竟都被点亮了,经过尝试,功能都可以正常使用。
然而,当打开Settings界面,发现除About页面外,其他功能设置页面并未被点亮,依然无法使用。

看样子,仍需往上回溯W20寄存器的来源。不难发现,是来自sub_1000E4304的返回值。
__text:0x1000BF60C BL sub_1000E4304 ; Branch with Link __text:0x1000BF610 MOV X20, X0 ; Rd = Op2
无须急着深入sub_1000E4304分析,先查看它的交叉引用,共五处。
Address Text sub_10008B7AC+128 BL sub_1000E4304 sub_1000BF3EC+220 BL sub_1000E4304 sub_1000E3448+210 BL sub_1000E4304 sub_100123578+220 BL sub_1000E4304 sub_1001682C4+12C BL sub_1000E4304
其中,在sub_100123578内部发现了针对C*S*_X.Preferences.toolbar的操作,见如下汇编片段。又因对比sub_10008B7AC与sub_100123578相关指令片段,发现二者极具相似性。由此推测,在sub_10008B7AC中会按照许可状态对状态栏菜单上的按钮进行隐藏或显示处理,在sub_100123578中会依据许可状态对设置首选项中的按钮进行灰化或点亮操作。
__text:0x100123798 BL sub_1000E4304 ; Branch with Link __text:0x10012379C MOV X21, X0 ; Rd = Op2 __text:0x1001237A0 MOV X0, X22 ; Rd = Op2 __text:0x1001237A4 BL _swift_bridgeObjectRelease ; Branch with Link __text:0x1001237A8 MOV X0, X25 ; Rd = Op2 __text:0x1001237AC BL _swift_bridgeObjectRelease ; Branch with Link __text:0x1001237B0 ADRP X19, #_OBJC_IVAR_$__TtC11C*S*_X11Preferences.toolbar@PAGE ; Address of Page __text:0x1001237B4 TBZ W21, #0, loc_1001237EC ; Test and Branch Zero __text:0x1001237B8 ADRP X8, #selRef_toolbarButtonClick_@PAGE ; Address of Page __text:0x1001237BC LDR X23, [X8,#selRef_toolbarButtonClick_@PAGEOFF] ; Load from Memory __text:0x1001237C0 LDR X20, [X19,#_OBJC_IVAR_$__TtC11C*S*_X11Preferences.toolbar@PAGEOFF] ; Load from Memory __text:0x1001237C4 ADD X0, X28, X20 ; Rd = Op1 + Op2 __text:0x1001237C8 BL _swift_unknownObjectWeakLoadStrong ; Branch with Link __text:0x1001237CC MOV X22, X0 ; Rd = Op2 __text:0x1001237D0 ADD X0, X28, X20 ; Rd = Op1 + Op2 __text:0x1001237D4 BL _swift_unknownObjectWeakLoadStrong ; Branch with Link
而sub_1000E4304函数正是决定这些操作的关键所在。因此对于破解而言,只需使核心验证函数sub_1000E4304定值返回1,即可解锁所有功能,具体见以下操作。
(lldb) br s -a 0x1000E4304 Breakpoint 28: where = C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol7449, address = 0x00000001000e4304 (lldb) r There is a running process, kill it and restart?: [Y/n] Y Process 15993 exited with status = 9 (0x00000009) Process 16354 launched: 'C*S*X.app/Contents/MacOS/C*S*X' (arm64) Process 16354 stopped * thread #1, queue = 'com.apple.main-thread', stop reason = breakpoint 28.1 frame #0: 0x00000001000e4304 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol7449 C*S*X`___lldb_unnamed_symbol7449: -> 0x1000e4304 <+0>: ubfx x8, x5, #56, #4 0x1000e4308 <+4>: and x9, x4, #0xffffffffffff 0x1000e430c <+8>: tst x5, #0x2000000000000000 0x1000e4310 <+12>: csel x7, x9, x8, eq Target 0: (C*S*X) stopped. (lldb) memory write 0x1000E4304 20 00 80 52 c0 03 5f d6 (lldb) c

破解总结
功能解锁去灰调用链
-[C*S*_X.AppDelegate applicationDidFinishLaunching:]+5C → sub_10018C150+188 → sub_1000E3448+254 → sub_1000BF3EC+220 → sub_1000E4304(lldb) memory write 0x1000E4304 20 00 80 52 c0 03 5f d6
激活弹窗消除调用链
-[C*S*_X.AppDelegate applicationDidFinishLaunching:]+5C → sub_10018C150+1C0 → sub_100224224+3C0 → sub_10018C41C+24(0x10018C440)(lldb) memory write 0x10018C440 1f 20 03 d5
